Hong Kong is known for its financial sector significance, in particular of its popularity within the Banking industry for the range of services it provides, and the service providers themselves. This paper explores the boards of Directors behind the 12 listed 
Introduction
In recent years, interest in the role of corporate governance has increased considerably in order to maintain an orderly commercial environment. Due to the special roles of banks in economies financial systems, a special study of corporate governance is even more relevant for the banking industry. As Hong Kong is an important international financial centre, a three year comparative analysis of the corporate governance of its banking sector has particular significance for the Hong Kong business setting.
According to the Hong Kong Trade Development Council (HKTDC, 2007) , 76 of the world banks have a presence in Hong Kong, it is the second largest loan syndication centre in Asia as well as being Asia's third largest international banking sector. Hong
Kong is now the sixth largest foreign exchange centre, and is known for its "high standards of market transparency, disclosure and prudently supervised financial 
Underlying Literature and Theory

Corporate Governance
Corporate Governance is not a new concept. But, the spate of recent large scale corporate collapses has been a catalyst for popularising the prescription of governance regimes intended to ensure managers act for and on behalf of not only shareholders, but also with a wider focus on broader stakeholder issues (Monks and Minow, 2004) . Governments worldwide are issuing corporate governance guidelines and legislating best practice rules, especially designed to prevent large listed corporations from suffering the financial distress of the kind experienced recently by the likes of the Maxwell Group and Polly Peck in the UK, HIH, OneTel and Harris Scarfe in Australia, and Enron, Sunbeam and WorldCom in the US (Clarke, Dean and Oliver, 2003) .
Clearly the overriding common objective of governance regimes is to create and maintain an orderly commercial environment, for the benefit of the public interest. Corporate governance itself has a long history, although the term was not used by such economists as Smith (1776) and Spencer (1862) -the idea that the running of a corporation ethically would bring profits to the corporation and by default economic benefit to society underpinned their discussions. Indeed, Drutman and Cray (2004) note that corporations were perceived originally to be 'arms of the state'. Viewing corporate America following the merger and trust movements at the end of the nineteenth century, Berle and Means (1932) popularised the idea that whereas entrepreneurs were good with ideas, specialist managers should run businesses. And that in any event because of the emerging corporate structure, professional managers had to be engaged. Thus, by the early 1930s the notion of the potential problems associated with the separation of ownership from control were firmly embedded in the corporate regulatory literature; as an ultimate consequence of what Bryer (1993) labelled the socialization of capital.
Those potential problems underpin Jensen and Meckling's (1976) discussion of the costs associated with agency monitoring initiatives. Agents' propensities to not always act for the benefit of their principals in preference to gaining a personal benefit, created an ethical dilemma provoking and justifying the development of legislative and other impositions of corporate governance principles. It has also been noted that a generalisation is set in the specific context of publicly listed companies in which shareholders are typically divorced from any active association in or with management.
Anglo-American corporate governance is almost completely focused on the means of enhancing and protecting shareholders ' value (Siebens, 2002) , derived from an increase in transactions within a framework in which owner-managers are replaced by salaried managers (Carlos & Nicholas, 1988) . Classical economists such as Smith (1776) and corporate observers such as Berle and Means (1932) perceived the dangers inherent in the separation of ownership (principal) and control (agent) regarding managers' actions.
Drawing upon their analysis of the behaviour of US corporations in the World War 1 period following the trust movement engineered by the robber-barons, Berle and Means (1932) realised the growing power of the organisation, and the inevitable separation of power between executive management and their diverse range of shareholders -a theme pursued in the modern setting by Jensen and Meckling (1976) in their discussion of the concept of the agency costs of monitoring the behaviour of potentially errant opportunistic managers (Clarke, Dean and Oliver, 2003) not acting in the best interests of their owner principals.
Although Adam Smith did not use the term 'corporate governance' directly, he was aware of the implications.
"The directors of companies, being managers of other people's money than their own, it cannot well be expected that they should watch over it with the same anxious vigilance with which the partners in a private copartnery frequently watch over their own" (Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations, 1776.) Governance steersmanship then, is necessary for corporate entities, nation states, associations, clubs, and societies to function legitimately and efficiently for the benefit of those for whose wellbeing they are argued to have been created. Management is concerned with organising, planning, controlling, and leading organisations with limited resources to achieve goals (Robbins, Bergman, Stagg and Coulter, 2000) , but governance also involves the limitation of powers to control and direct, and regulate organisations (Tricker, 1984) . 
Directors' Duties in Hong Kong
In its Principles of Corporate Governance, the American Law Institute (1984) refers to the directors' duty of loyalty and the duty of care, otherwise known as fiduciary duties and the duty of care and skill. Derived from Roman law, the term "fiduciary" is used to describe a person who has the character of or similar to that of a trustee, and who is obliged to act solely for that person's benefit (Martin, 1997) . Company directors and senior employees to whom the board of directors has delegated managerial duties have a fiduciary relationship with the company (Green v Bestobell Industries Ltd). 
Corporate Governance in Banks
Directors on the Boards of Banks are critical to their success, and long term survival (Stanwick and Stanwick, 2005) , and are the organisations' ultimate decision-making body (Psaros and Seamer, 2002) . Their primary function is to oversee, monitor and evaluate management to make sure that stakeholders are balanced, laws complied with and ethics upheld (McKendall, Sanchez and Sicilian, 1999) . This can be achieved through several ways:
1)
A mixture of both executive (or inside) and non-executive and independent (or outside) directors-specifically that at least three of the directors be independent non-executive directors (ASX GCG, 2003; HKMA, 2000) .
2) A separation of the roles of Chairman and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) (ASX GCG, 2003; HKMA, 2000) .
3) Education of Directors, for example Directors who have been further educated in terms of obtaining Masters or Doctorate degrees (Tsui and Gul, 2000) 4) Experience in terms of other directorships held
5) High quality auditors, such as a Big Four auditor
The mixture of these five corporate governance initiatives is termed Banking Sector
Governance (BSG).
Based on the underlying literature, the research question is:
What type of Banking Sector Governance (BSG) is exhibited by Banks Listed in
Hong Kong?
The Method of Inquiry
Archival data was collected from publicly available sources, such as company web-sites and annual reports of the twelve Stock Exchange of Hong Kong (SEHK) listed banks.
Information gathered were used to determine whether there is separation of roles between
Chairman and CEO; to determine the number of independent non-executive directors of the banks; the directors' backgrounds and qualifications, and the who the auditor was. 
Data Analysis and Results
The data collected was based on an initial study by Barnes and Kwan (2006) , which was limited to 2004 and did not contain any auditor information. This study primary looks at five areas of interest of Banking Sector Governance. 2005 shows again that all banks have at least three independent non-executive directors, and that two of the three Banks from 2004 who had more than 50% independent nonexecutive directors now have 60% and 65% respectively. For 2006, again all banks have more than three independent non-executive directors. It is interesting to note that now one of the Banks (HSBC) has 72% independent nonexecutive directors, which has grown from 59% in 2004 and 65% in 2005. It appears that the majority of Directors hold other Directorships either in subsidiaries or other Corporations. 
Discussion
In relation to separation of CEO and Chairperson, according to Millstein (1992) The data shows that all listed Banks have three or more independent directors. According to Wallace and Naser (1995) , it shows that the higher the proportion of independent nonexecutive directors, the more comprehensive the financial disclosures. It is interesting to note that in 2006 the three Banks with the largest representation of Independent NonExecutive directors were HSBS Holdings Plc with 72%, Standard Chartered with 62%
and Hang Seng Bank with 53%. 2007) . It also appears then that Listed Banks in Hong Kong comply with the code in terms of three or more independent non-executive directors. In relation to qualifications of directors apart from Standard Chartered, it appears that overall the level of education is a factor in determining the quality of directors. Recalling that according to Tsui and Gul (2000) , the quality of rather than the quantity of nonexecutive directors is important for effective corporate governance, in addition to investigating the number of independent non-executive directors of the listed banks, the quality of its Board members was analysed. Assumptions have been made that at least those with Masters degrees or professional doctorates are considered to be good "quality".
As far as other directorships held, it should be noted that within the Banks, all indicated 50% or more of their directors were also directors of outside firms. Holding other directorships is reasonably considered indicative of the business esteem enjoyed by individual directors. Cet par, the greater the number of directorships, the greater the implied business acumen and esteem.
In relation to the hiring of a big audit firm, it is generally considered that the big four audit firms of Ernst and Young, Pricewaterhousecoopers (PWC), KPMG and Deloitte TT have the highest quality audit procedures and that firms using them have an expectation that they are stringent in their application of the "true and fair view" of the corporations (HKICPA, 1995) .
While these guides are not intended to be exhaustive or prescriptive in nature, it is (no doubt) believed that the principles and recommendations they contain provide a useful reference for listed banks aiming to implement or enhance their systems of internal governance and external governance via auditors work. It is noted that all Listed Banks were audited by one of the big four audit firms.
Conclusion
This study has confirmed the justification of the claim that Listed Banks in Hong Kong exhibit a high amount of corporate governance based on the fact that (i) the majority separate Chairperson from CEO, (ii) the majority have at least 3 independent nonexecutive directors in compliance with listing rules, (iii and iv) they have good quality boards in terms of (a) education and qualification and (b) experience, and lastly (v) they are audited by big four audit firms. Banking Sector Governance then is exhibited by Listed Banks in Hong Kong, and is most likely responsible for the ongoing importance of the region in terms of its international financial significance.
